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As a consequence of public safety, officers at times must use deadly force to protect 
themselves and others. Professional, respectful, effective and accountable policing 
demands that this use of force be subjected to and withstand not only legal, but ethical 
scrutiny regarding such a controversial topic. The ability to justify an act does not make 
it necessary and deadly force by police officers is the rule, not the exception. Police 
officers are often thrust into unpredictable and stressful situations, where their reactions 
have grave consequences. Police agencies have an obligation to ensure their officers 
are trained in best practices regarding force. Police agencies should implement policy 
that prohibits officer created jeopardy. Policy implementation which communicates a 
sanctity for life demonstrates that police agencies are sincere in preserving life 
whenever possible. This is best communicated by clear policy that promotes safety for 
citizens and officers. The purpose of this paper is to identify the need for policy 
governing officer behavior, which will promote uniformity, consistency, and best 
practices. Incorporating such policy will not adversely impact an officer’s ability to 
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The use of deadly force is the most serious action a police officer will ever take. 
Officers are empowered by law with the authority to use deadly force when that force is 
necessary to protect their lives or the lives of third parties. Officers are also entrusted by 
their communities to only use deadly force as a last resort. In the United States (U.S.) it 
is especially important that officers and their agencies remain cognizant of their role in a 
democracy based constitutional republic. Law enforcement is a function of policing and 
many states, as has Texas, empowers public servants with the authority to use deadly 
force as peace officers. The term peace officer is an honorable designation and serves 
as a constant reminder that such officers should value life and have a duty to preserve it 
whenever possible. Most peace officers serve their entire careers without ever using 
deadly force, but for the few that do, that force must be necessary. 
 Controversial police shootings have called into question the legitimacy of police 
force on the grounds of necessity. Officer worn body cameras and citizen videos have 
captured officers using deadly force when they have faced no apparent threat. The 
2015 Walter Scott and 2016 Philando Castile shootings are two examples. Less 
commonly discussed is deadly force used by officers when the threat to their safety is 
apparent, but which would not have occurred if not for the officers’ action (Garrison, 
2017). 
 In these instances, officers place themselves in a compromising position where 
deadly force is then justified. Some examples include officers stepping in the path of 
moving vehicles, jumping on or in vehicles, and reaching inside running vehicles. These 
types of behavior are collectively known as officer created jeopardy, which follows split-
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second syndrome and at best is reckless (Miller, 2015; Garrett & Stoughton, 2017). 
White (2016) interprets split-second syndrome, which was originally coined by Fyfe in 
1989 as “the shortsighted, tunnel-vision standard for viewing the justifiability of officer 
actions” (p. 226). Miller (2015) describes it as a misperception and overreaction on the 
officer’s part. Officer created jeopardy does not honor the pledge to “safeguard lives” 
nor does it reflect the promise of “never employing unnecessary force or violence” 
displayed in the police code of ethics (see Appendix).  
Police agencies have an opportunity to communicate their commitment to the 
sanctity of life internally and externally. Police agencies should implement policy that 
prohibits officer created jeopardy. Relationships between police agencies and the 
communities they serve are greatly influenced by transparency, accountability and a 
commitment to service. Officer conduct involving deadly force must be held to the 
highest standard of scrutiny because nothing is more important than human life. No 
police action has further reaching consequences than the use of deadly force. Even 
when necessary, deadly police force profoundly impacts the officer, recipient, families of 
both, the agency, and greater community (Miller, 2015). The purpose of this paper is to 
communicate that police agencies should enact policies that prohibit officer created 
jeopardy. Having a policy that promotes best practices regarding deadly force 
simultaneously reduces the likelihood of an officer having to use deadly force and 
embodies the ethos of professional public service.  
POSITION 
Police officers fulfill a unique role in society. The power they wield daily is 
unappalled even by members of occupations deemed more prestigious. According to 
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Alpert and McDonald (2001), state granted coercive and control power through the use 
of force is the characteristic that most separates police from other members of society. 
It is necessary that the exercise of this power be guided within the administrative 
framework of the police employer.  
Force is generally described as necessary, which is that force an officer uses to 
protect the officer or a third party, and excessive, which is defined as force that exceeds 
the principles of safety and control. Occasional miscalculations in force are expected 
due to human error. There is no legal requirement that officers use the minimum 
amount of force in every encounter because this is understandably infeasible. This 
paper also does not imply that an officer should ever compromise their safety or the 
public’s by waiting until deadly force is used against them. It suggests however, that 
when deadly force is used, it meets the criteria as a response to a deadly threat, which 
is necessitated by suspects, not officers.     
Officer created jeopardy, also known as tactical violations, normally results from 
split-second syndrome when police officers unnecessarily place themselves in tactically 
disadvantageous situations (Miller, 2015; Garrison, 2017; Garrett & Stoughton, 2017). 
Police agencies should ensure they implement clear cut policies designed to keep the 
officers they employ and the public they are sworn to protect safe, establish community 
trust through accountability and conscientious policy, reduce officer stress, and mitigate 
civil liability.  
Police agencies have generally gone through great lengths to ensure the safety 
and well-being of their officers. Such practices have ranged from establishing peer-
counseling services, regulating the number of hours an officer can work, incentivizing or 
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requiring officers to meet physical fitness standards and providing access to employee 
assistance programs (Fiedler, 2011; Mumford, Taylor & Kubu, 2015). Regarding officer 
use of force however, police agencies have historically failed to provide adequate 
guidelines and were forced by the courts to improve and reform policy and practices. 
Court ordered policing sets a standard, but one in which police take a backseat in 
protecting officers and the public (Garrett & Stoughton, 2017).  
In Tennessee v. Garner, the Supreme Court prohibited police deadly force 
against fleeing suspects based on their felony status alone. Prior to this 1985 ruling, 32 
states authorized officers to use deadly force against fleeing felony suspects who did 
not pose an immediate threat to officers or third parties (Fyfe, 1981; Nowacki, 2015). 
Most police departments nationwide did not establish more restrictive policies despite 
scholars urging police to do so before being mandated by the courts (Fyfe, 1981; 
Rosenthal, 2016).  
Loose or non-existent use of force policies endanger officers and citizens 
(Prenzler, Porter & Alpert, 2013). Fyfe (1981) questioned the degree to which police 
accurately report citizen deaths at the hands of police. By contrast, countless police 
officers have fallen victim to tactical violations, but the details surrounding such deaths 
are often not made available to the public. Agencies may not wish to tarnish the officer’s 
legacy by assigning any personal blame, further traumatize the officer’s family or 
subject the agency to liability. Administrators may later enact policy without ever 
acknowledging the precipitating event.  
Meyers (2002) explained how tactical violations resulted in injuries and deaths of 
officers in 21 incidents during training or enforcement operations. In the Meyers study, 
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officers killed fellow officers 17 times, one officer died by his own hand, and three 
suffered non-life-threatening injuries from gunshot wounds. These tragedies are 
indicative of the need for increased operational and tactical safety and have relevance 
for policies prohibiting officer created jeopardy involving citizens. The preventable loss 
of life in training should be conceptualized and projected to encompass officers and 
citizens in the field.   
Bravery and initiative are praised in policing with rookie and veteran officers 
being susceptible to taking shortcuts. Newer officers may want to shed their rookie 
status or impress their peers while veterans may become complacent by overcalculating 
their experience. When officer created jeopardy results in a favorable outcome, the 
agency may ignore or be reluctant to take corrective action. Pinizzotto, Davis & Miller, 
(2007) make this point by stating, “the community and the media often consider these 
as acts of heroism and applaud an officer for taking needless and, perhaps, 
irresponsible risks. This kind of reaction can send a harmful message to other officers” 
(p.4). 
Bohrer, Kern, and Davis (2008) praise officer restraint and acknowledge that 
officers frequently only use deadly force when they have no other choice but to protect 
themselves or others from violence. Furthermore, police force is relatively rare, occurs 
in approximately one sixth of custodial arrests, and is likely to be minor (Garner, 
Maxwell & Heraux, 2002; Miller, 2015). However, the use of deadly force remains one of 
the most traumatic events a law enforcement officer will ever experience and is as 
comparatively stressful as the death of a fellow officer (Violanti, 2016). Policing is a 
demanding field where organizational ambiguity along the lines of structure, practices, 
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and policy contribute to officer stress beyond what is experienced in the street (Bishopp, 
Worrall & Piquero, 2016). Policing is highly unpredictable, but police agencies must take 
necessary precautions to reduce the likelihood an officer will inflict or suffer from trauma 
associated with the use of deadly force.  
Vague or overly broad use of force policies also damages police legitimacy and 
are counterintuitive when one considers the core purpose of policing is to fundamentally 
protect life (see Appendix). Police often encounter people in crisis experiencing a broad 
range of emotional, psychological, and physical ailments. Such individuals will not 
always behave rationally, and police should deescalate, not be a contributor to their 
distress (Miller, 2015). 
Currently, officers are also receiving mandated training in greater detail in 
preparation for responding to mentally ill persons. The expectation is that officers will 
utilize their training to defuse potentially violent encounters. Some mentally ill or 
emotionally distraught people intentionally provoke police to use deadly force against 
them by exhibiting behavior designed to force an officer’s decision making. Within the 
literature, this performance is known as suicide by cop (Patton & Fremouw, 2016).  
Miller (2015) asserts that approximately 10% of police shootings are caused by suicidal 
individuals that provoke officers to shoot them. Officers will at times be required to use 
deadly force in suicide by cop situations, but Lord (2014) identifies the importance of 
police tactics in limiting coerced police force.  
The potential for civil liability exists and agencies that do not have policies 
against officer created jeopardy expose their controlling governments, themselves and 
their officers to unnecessary litigation (Rosenthal, 2016).  Wrongful damage and death 
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lawsuits brought against officers and agencies generally claim that there was a failure 
by the agency to train, supervise, or that officers were retained despite demonstrating 
unsuitability for police work (Lee & Vaughn, 2010). Regardless of the success of such 
suits, a cost occurs in monetary and reputational terms (Garrett & Stoughton, 2017). 
Schwartz (2016) found that many governments settle out of court and the annual cost of 
such settlements exceed $100 million on average. Agencies that are reluctant to 
implement policy and training because of the perceived cost soon find corrective action 
is often grossly more expensive (Meyers, 2002).   
COUNTER ARGUMENTS 
Research has proven that attempts to impose rigid agency standards across the 
board without consideration for the elasticity required in street level encounters has 
proven unsuccessful. Officer discretion has long been a hallmark of good and effective 
policing. It is inevitable because no officer can enforce every law (Bronitt & Stenning, 
2011). Discretion is also important internally because no agency can hope to 
administratively cover every eventuality (Tummers & Bekkers, 2014). Police officers 
must make sudden judgments based on real-time information, and citizens rely on 
people, not policies (Shane, 2010). Without the flexibility to navigate the law and 
dynamic situations, police officers would render a disservice to citizens as their choices 
would be robotlike and predetermined by policy (Nowacki, 2015).  
The policy recommendation for force does not take into account that an officer’s 
safety may be compromised if the officer hesitates while weighing split second 
decisions against policy and the perceived threat of discipline for potential violations 
(Rosenthal, 2016). Blanket policy rarely has the anticipated effect and unintended 
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consequences may arise from an overzealous desire to curtail officer discretion. Police 
officers experience a great deal of stress and much of this stress is compounded by 
organizational administrators (Shane, 2010).   
Officers are accustomed to adjusting to the unpredictability of their public 
interaction but expect support and stability from their supervisors and managers. 
Although police work can present physical dangers and be emotionally taxing, officers 
experience greater levels of distress and dissatisfaction from rigid and misapplied 
policies than from the public (Moon & Jonson, 2012). When officers feel under siege by 
the public and their police administrators, they may adapt attitudes of de-policing, which 
hinder law enforcement and public safety. De-policing occurs when officers take a 
hands-off approach to crime because they feel their leaders will sacrifice them in favor 
of political correctness (Nix, Wolfe, & Campbell, 2018).  
Police officers often experience volatile and unpredictable encounters. Many of 
these encounters stem from emergency calls for assistance from the public (Hine, 
Porter, Westera & Alpert, 2018). The public expects its police officers to act and not shy 
away from conflict. Bedi (2016) states, “officers have no duty to retreat and, in some 
jurisdictions, can kill even if there is no imminent threat of deadly harm” (p.25).  Officers 
have an obligation to address crime and citizen concerns, which often place them in 
direct conflict with some members of the public (Nowacki, 2015). Overly restrictive 
policy handcuffs officers and may cause the public to lose confidence in its police if the 
public perceives officers as not engaging its concerns.  
 Proponents of the officer created jeopardy doctrine incorrectly assumes that civil 
liability attaches when officers must use force that may be considered controversial, but 
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this assumption is inaccurate. Rather than rely on emotion and speculation, it is more 
appropriate to utilize case law, which provides a guiding principle for action. The 
objective reasonableness standard was established in Graham v. Connor (1989), in 
which the Court found “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged 
from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 
vision of hindsight” (p. 396). The Court reaffirmed in Los Angeles v. Mendez that 
although law enforcement officers’ actions may have provoked a shooting, they nor their 
agency were liable for damages to the plaintiff (Macfarlane, 2018). To impose a higher 
standard through administration than required by the highest court of the land is to 
usurp both police discretion and judicial oversight.  
 Police discretion is a vital tool of law enforcement and one that must be tempered 
through a respect of life and an ethos of service. Without such temperance, discretion is 
reduced to individual passion with scant regard for the consequences that attach. An 
officer’s decision to use or not use deadly force endures long after the perceived 
urgency in the moment of that decision. It is erroneous to contend that administrative 
oversight of officer behavior concerning potential deadly force tactics is unwarranted. To 
the contrary, the guiding principle of such policy is to safeguard both the officer and 
community from preventable harm.    
 The necessity of addressing officer created jeopardy is not an indictment of an 
officer’s decision-making ability and absent policy, it is just as likely to result from the 
failure of an agency to provide direction (White, 2016). Rather, a concentrated effort 
must be made to provide all officers with a set of demonstrated and proven best 
practices. No policy can completely indemnify nor insulate, but it can help clarify 
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expectations in otherwise uncertain and ambiguous situations. While officers have no 
legal duty to retreat, such retreat may be the prudent action to take if it preserves lives 
(Pinizzotto et al., 2007). Individual officers are usually not held directly financially liable 
in civil suits regarding force. Schwartz (2016) reported that officers are required to pay 
in less than .02 percent of use of force cases, but that costs to the employing agency 
and government may be crippling, which negatively impacts salaries, benefits, 
operations, and other resources.  
 Policing must evolve as it is presented with increasing challenges. Some 
required changes are incremental, while others are dynamic and mandate immediate 
redress. One method to analyze officer created jeopardy along this continuum is to 
consider the issue of police response from a different angle. The advent of heavily 
armed and dedicated active shooters has forever changed the way police officers train 
and respond. The North Hollywood Bank robbery in Los Angeles, California in 1997 and 
the Columbine, Colorado massacre of 1999 are two relevant examples. The North 
Hollywood shootout found officers underequipped while Columbine pointed to the need 
for an immediate and planned police response (Cannon, 2013; Strachota, 2014).  
 Prior to the above occurrences, there was not much training in the general law 
enforcement community about being outgunned or addressing active shooter threats 
that were usually engaged by tactical units such as special weapons and tactics 
(S.W.A.T). However, law enforcement has made adjustments in policy, training, and 
response because public safety required an operational change. In each instance 
above, both time and risk were factors, and this is no less true for officer created 
jeopardy.   
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RECOMMENDATION  
 Police departments nationwide should implement policy that prohibits officer 
created jeopardy. The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) recommends that 
police departments consider best practices as identified through research and 
implemented by peer law enforcement agencies. Suggestions made by PERF include 
officers reconsidering their approach to persons with weapons that do not possess 
firearms, relying on cover, distance, time, training for non-lethal takedowns whenever 
possible, and the involvement of supervision on the scene (Abanonu, 2018). 
 In addition, agencies should prohibit officers from placing themselves in the path 
of moving vehicles, jumping in the bed of trucks or on the hood or roof of moving 
vehicles, reaching inside a vehicle to remove the keys while the engine is running and 
the driver seat is occupied, and rushing into a dangerous situation where an immediate 
threat to life does not exist and when backup is available and capable of being 
summoned. Not every call for service, citizen initiated, or officer driven interaction 
constitutes an emergency. Case law established in Graham v. Connor (1989), provides 
that police force must be judged using the perspective of a reasonable officer on the 
scene. Clear policy can provide guidance under specific circumstances which help 
inform what is acceptable and therefore reasonable.  
In any policy implementation at least four broad classifications for the use of 
deadly force should be considered and are as follows: (1) the individual’s possession or 
attempt to immediately access a weapon; (2) the individual is armed and is attempting 
to gain a position of advantage; (3) the individual possesses the capability to inflict 
serious bodily injury with or without a weapon and is attempting to do so; and (4) the 
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individual is fleeing after inflicting or attempting to inflict death or serious bodily injury 
and still possesses that capability (Miller, 2016).  
The highest concern of law enforcement must be the preservation of human life 
and not merely liability. Officers have a duty to protect themselves and the public. 
Officers should never unnecessarily jeopardize their safety or that of the public through 
a rash action that places them in an untenable position regarding force. Just because 
their officers have not used deadly force through actions that are preventable, no chief 
law enforcement executive can ignore that the potential exists. Policy based on best 
practices nationwide should be established to guide officers on the use of deadly force.   
 While it may be uncomfortable to create policy more restrictive than what is 
allowed by law, agencies and chief executives are encouraged to remember that the 
law often must catch up to best practices and what is in the best interest of the public. 
Shooting at unarmed felons suspected of property crimes was never a good practice, 
but a majority of law enforcement agencies endorsed or allowed it until they were forced 
to change. Forward thinking and future leaders do not wait to be forced.  
The failure of police departments to formulate policies that pertains to their 
potential to cause avoidable harm remains a point of criticism (Friedman & 
Pnomarenko, 2015). An overreliance on the judiciary for operational directives is 
misguided. No judicial body can ever bridge the abyss of departmental expectations 
with officer actions, which is rightly communicated through policy. Garrison (2017) 
makes the argument that, “not every moral wrong is a legal wrong and not every legal 
wrong has a criminal sanction as a remedy. What is lawful is not always just and what is 
just is not always required by the law” (p. 243). 
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Establishing policy alone will not eliminate acts of officer created jeopardy but 
such policy will help reduce the frequency of force by police officers. Given the nature of 
police work, officers will always deal with stressful situations that require split second 
decisions. Nevertheless, the recommended policy within this paper and accountability 
for compliance will incentivize officers to behave appropriately and consider the 
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As a law enforcement officer, my fundamental duty is to serve society, to 
safeguard lives and property, to protect the innocent against deception, the weak  
against oppression or intimidation, and the peaceful against violence or disorder,  
and to respect the constitutional rights of all people to liberty, equality, and  
justice.  
  
I will keep my private life unsullied as an example to all; maintain courageous  
calm in the face of danger, scorn or ridicule; develop self-restraint; and be  
constantly mindful to the welfare of others. Honest in thought and deed in both  
my personal and official life, I will be exemplary in obeying the laws of the land  
and the regulations of my department. Whatever I see or hear of a confidential  
nature or what is confided to me in my official capacity will be kept secret unless  
revelation is necessary in the performance of my duty.  
  
I will never act officiously or permit personal feelings, prejudices, animosities or 
friendships to influence my decisions. With no compromise for crime and with  
relentless prosecution of criminals. I will enforce the law courteously and  
appropriately without fear of favor, malice or ill will, never employing  
unnecessary force or violence and never accepting gratuities.  
  
I recognize the badge of my office as a symbol of public faith, and accept it as a  
public trust to be held so long as I am true to the ethics of the police service. I will  
constantly strive to achieve these objectives and ideals, dedicating myself before  
God to my chosen profession–law enforcement.  
  
 
CODE OF ETHICS 
